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J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC.
127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 10 (Mar. 3, 2011) 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE - MECHANIC’S LIEN PRIORITY ACTION

Summary
The Court considered an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in
a mechanic’s lien priority action.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and held that the Corus Bank’s
recorded deed of trust had priority over appellant Dunn’s preconstruction mechanic’s lien
because the preconstruction work was not visible, and visibility is a requirement under NRS §
108.22112 2 for the establishment of a mechanic’s lien priority. The Court further held that the
2003 amendments to NRS § 108.225, which expanded the definition of “work” to
preconstruction services, does not vitiate the requirement that the work is visible to gain priority
over subsequently recorded deeds of trust. The court also held that this statutory visibility
requirement cannot be waived even if the lender has constructive or actual knowledge of
preconstruction services, and that removing power lines, placing signs, or other forms of
perfunctory services does not satisfy the visibility requirement of NRS § 108.22112. 3
Factual And Procedural History
Midbar Condo (“Midbar”) hired appellant J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. (“Dunn”) to
perform preconstruction services that totaled $1,000,000 between August 2005 and March 2006.
On March 16, 2006, Corus Construction Venture, LLC (“Corus Bank”) gave Midbar a
construction loan after a site inspection, where the site inspector concluded that aside from
removing power lines and placing architectural signage, no work was performed on the property.
Subsequently, Corus Bank agreed to use Dunn for the contracting work, and
acknowledged Dunn’s preconstruction services for the project. During initial negotiations with
Dunn, Corus Bank attempted to introduce a subordination clause in Dunn’s contract which Dunn
did not agree to, and which was not included in the final draft of the contract. Dunn began work
on March 20, 2006, and the project was completed in June 2008. After completion of the
1

By Christopher Scott Connell.
NRS § 108.22112 defines the commencement of construction, in relevant part, as the date when “(1) work is
performed; or (2) Materials or equipment furnished in connection with a work of improvement, is visible from a
reasonable inspection of the site.”3 Id.
3
Id.
2

project, Dunn properly perfected its mechanic’s lien on September 8, 2008 for the portion of the
contract that remained unpaid. Midbar subsequently defaulted on the loan, giving rise to a
priority dispute between Corus and Dunn.
In October 2008, Dunn filed a motion for declaratory judgment and a subsequent
summary judgment motion in the district court. Corus Bank opposed the declaratory judgment
and the summary judgment motion. Both Dunn’s and Corus Bank’s motions for summary
judgment were dismissed. Corus Bank filed a renewed motion for summary judgment in March
2009. The district court granted this motion because there were “no genuine factual issues
indicating that Dunn provided any visible construction work on the property at the time Corus’
deed of trust was recorded.” 4 Dunn then filed this appeal before the Nevada Supreme court.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court previously held that a mechanic’s lien will take priority over
a subsequently recorded deed of trust on a construction project, as long as the actual construction
work is visible. 5 Dunn raised several concerns regarding the visibility requirement in the
mechanic’s lien statutes in Nevada. The Nevada Supreme Court reviews the lower court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo. 6
The Term “Commencement of Construction” Plainly Requires Visibility for Both Work
Performed and Materials or Equipment Furnished for a Work of Improvement
First, Dunn argued that NRS § 108.225 is ambiguous because of a perceived
inconsistency in the statute due to a “flush line arrow” (=>) and the placement of a “comma” in
NRS § 108.22112(2). 7 NRS § 108.22112(2) defines the “commencement of construction” but
Dunn maintained that the placement of the flush line and the comma make the statute unclear. 8
NRS § 0.025(2)(c) explains that an arrow symbol (=>) defines an area representing a “flush line”
and contrary to what Dunn proposed, this arrow did not support a finding that the Legislature
intended to change the statute to eliminate a visibility requirement. The Court held that several
cannons of statutory construction support a reading that the visibility requirement in mechanic’s
lien priority statutes is not confused by the inclusion of a flush line arrow. The Court rejected
Dunn’s proposed reading of the statute because the statute is clear on its face and adopting
Dunn’s version of interpretation would render the paragraph grammatically incorrect
4

J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc., v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 5, pg. 5 (citations omitted).
NRS § 108.22184 defines work as “the planning, design, geotechnical and environmental investigations,
surveying, labor and services provided by a lien claimant for the construction, alteration or repair of any
improvement, property or work of improvement whether the work is completed or partially completed.”
6
The court uses a de novo standard of review for cases where summary judgment is granted. See George L. Brown
Ins. v. Star Ins. Co., 126 Nev. __, 237 P.3d 92, 96 (2010)(citations omitted).
7
NRS § 108.22112(2) reads, “[m]aterials or equipment furnished in connection with a work of improvement, => is
visible from a reasonable inspection of the site.”
8
See id.
5

The Legislative Expansion of NRS § 108.22184, which Defines Lienable “work,” did not Affect
the Priority of Liens
The Court held that NRS § 108.22184, which grants lienable rights to preconstruction
services, is compatible with NRS § 108.22112 because having the right to lien on a property is
not the same as establishing the priority of that lien. The Court began by explaining that “actual
work” on a site is necessary before a mechanic’s lien will take priority over a subsequently
recorded deed of trust. 9
Next, the Court discussed that in 2003, the Legislature removed the definition of
“commencement of construction” from NRS § 108.225 and merged it with the holding from
Aladdin 10 to form NRS § 108.22112. The Legislature added the new provision of NRS §
108.22184 which defined “work.” There was no indication that the visibility requirement was no
longer an essential element of a mechanic’s lien.
The Court next looked to other jurisdictions where “similar conclusions” have been found
regarding the “distinction between lienable work and priority among lien claimants.” The Court
held that if the Legislature intended to change the visibility requirement, it would have drafted
the 2003 statutes in such a manner.
Finally, the Court relied on a public policy argument that supported the visibility
requirement, stating that prudent lenders would stop providing construction loans to developers
if they were exposed to the risks of unknown superior liens on a project prior to financing. The
visibility requirement exists to “inform prospective lenders inspecting the premises that liens had
attached.” 11
The Visibility Requirement is not Waivable
The Court next examined Dunn’s assertion that the requirements laid forth in NRS §
108.225 were waived by Corus Bank because Corus Bank had actual knowledge that Dunn was
performing preconstruction work. The Court rejected this line of reasoning by distinguishing the
holding in Kirkwold Construction, 12 where having actual knowledge of preconstruction work
waived the visibility requirement needed for superior priority because the Nevada statutes do not
address issues of notice for priority. 13 Nevada statues plainly require the commencement of
construction. 14

9

Aladdin Heating v. Trustees, Cent. States, 93 Nev. 257, 260, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977).
Id.
11
Aladdin Heating v. Trustees, Cent. States, 93 Nev. 257, 260, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977).
12
Kirkwold Construction v. M.G.A. Construction, 513 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1994).
13
See In re L. Bruce Nybo, Inc., 247 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000).
14
See Aladdin, 93 Nev. at 260, 563 P.2d at 84.
10

Dunn’s Work was not Visible
The Court held that Dunn’s work was merely preparatory work and not visible. This was
not sufficient to put Corus Bank on notice that their recorded deed of trust would not have senior
priority. The Court relied on the holding in Aladdin where “actual on-site construction” is
required to signal the commencement of construction on a site, not simply performing
preparatory “architectural, soil testing, or survey work.” 15 Therefore, Dunn’s lien was
subordinate to Corus Bank’s recorded deed of trust.
Conclusion
The “commencement of construction” as defined in NRS § 108.22112 is a necessary
element to establish the priority of a lien. The visibility of the work is a necessary element to the
“commencement of construction.” 16 The “visibility requirement” of the statute cannot be
waived.

15
16

Id.
See NRS § 108.22112 (2007).

